Voters Hold the Key: Lock-In, Mobility, and the Portability of Property Tax Exemptions

摘要: Since California voters approved Proposition 13 in 1978, fifteen states have enacted caps on the annual growth assessed property values. These laws often impose a great burden municipal finances and create horizontal inequity among homeowners. Why do choose to limit local government this way? Reasons may include controlling power of special interests, addressing agency failures officials (the "Leviathan" hypothesis), or preserving impact current but fleeting antitax political alignment. Yet research has found that voters' perception limitation's fiscal consequences not match reality, questioning rationality voter behavior. To counter position, another strand literature argues support for tax limitations is driven by perceptions inefficiency reasonable expectations who will ultimately bear burden. We explore view exploiting differential treatment generated assessment context recent, novel referendum Florida. examine 2008 constitutional amendment included unique provision making existing cap portable within state. test hypothesis understood mobility net cap. find high potential savings expected rates result higher portability. also degree racial segregation, presence nonresidential bases, share migrants from out state all contribute amendment. Results suggest were as concerned with reducing their own at expense other owners they curtailing expenditures.