How to Think about the Debate over the Reality of Beliefs

作者: Krzysztof Poslajko

DOI: 10.1007/S13164-021-00551-8

关键词: Natural (music)Philosophy of mindPhilosophy of scienceEpistemologyRealismMetaphysicsEliminative materialismConceptualizationPsychologyDo Not Track

摘要: The aim of this paper is to propose a new conceptualization the distinction between realism and anti-realism about beliefs that based on division natural non-natural properties, as defined by Lewis. It will be argued although traditional form beliefs, namely eliminative materialism, has failed (as it led unacceptable consequences), there possibility reformulate in question. background assumption proposal framework deflationism truth existence: assumed can said exist their attributions true. show even when we buy into such assumptions meaningfully distinguish realist anti-realist approach belief. According proposal, paradigmatic view should seen conjunction three claims: belief do not track objective similarities, are causally active, no viable way naturalizing content. shown seeing debate proposed important advantages allows issue made non-trivial tractable, introduces theoretical unity contemporary metaphysics beliefs.

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