Belief and Its Bedfellows

作者: Tim Bayne , Anandi Hattiangadi

DOI: 10.1057/9781137026521_7

关键词: AscriptionEpistemologyIdentity (social science)FeelingFolk psychologyRacismSocial psychologyPropositional attitudeCapgras delusionSociologyImplicit attitude

摘要: We humans spend a considerable amount of time talking about our own mental lives, as well the lives others. are interested in murderer’s motives, children’s feelings, zealot’s beliefs, ravings madman, and perceptions eyewitness. This interest leads to ascription states: desires, intentions, emotions, name few. And though we very good at ascribing states many ordinary contexts, find it difficult know what say range more unusual cases. Consider following vignettes: Self-Deception: Although should be plainly obvious Bridget that her son is dealing drugs from his bedroom, doesn’t explicitly acknowledge evidence, insists constant traffic son’s room result an active social life. However, also becomes uncomfortable whenever topic raised, much behaviour suggests she does believe drugs. Delusion: Sharon has Capgras delusion asserts parents have been replaced by impostors. seem particularly concerned fate parents, whom clearly cares for. Furthermore, willingness assert people who claim not they appears highly context-dependent. For example, when visual contact with impostors, but recognizes their identity them on telephone. Skywalk: Sonali prepared glass-bottomed bridge over Grand Canyon perfectly safe, asked cross palms sweat, clings railings, finds herself unable walk onto platform. Implicit Attitudes: Max rejects racism sexism explicit statements, performance wide implicit measures (startle responses, identification tasks, etc.) indicates he systematic tendencies treat men differently woman blacks whites.

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