Network games, information spread and endogenous security

摘要: A digital security breach where confidential information is being obtained often does not only influence the agent whose system infiltrated, also other agents socially or digitally connected to damaged can be affected. This leads externalities in which actual of an depend on his own investments security, it depends by agents. As no would invest protect others, misaligned incentives may appear this setting. It has been argued that these provoke under-investments, turn make network prone fail. Recently presumption challenged however introduction intelligent adversary who chooses optimal trade-off between expected damage and precision attack. In research we build impact adversary combing strategic attack model with a new for spread. We show tend compete under as increase cause someone else. When dependencies among are low, because network very dense probability shared small, even more than they social optimum. When dependencies over-investments prevail due second order force originating from adversary. situation precise as the gain compensates increased costs Nevertheless, when dependencies continue consequently becomes meaningless discourage attack, at some point pass under-investments. reached earlier network. However, consists several components strategically decide component attacked, always higher in a