Firms and Social Policy in the Post-Communist Bloc: Evidence from Russia

作者: Israel Marques

DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.2542755

关键词: BureaucracyBusinessCommitPoliticsMarket economyArgumentSocial policyWelfare stateSubsidyProperty rights

摘要: When does business support the expansion of social policy in developing world? Existing work on managers preferences has tended to concentrate developed world, where governments can credibly commit policy, tax evasion is constrained, and mechanisms exist hold bureaucracy accountable for implementation. In this paper, I relax these assumptions, arguing that weak institutions create opportunities some firms shift costs onto others: making more attractive. argue with political connections are uniquely positioned benefit from subsidies property rights protection, which decreases cost while low visibility evade taxes free-ride off universalistic policy. test argument using a survey 666 10 Russian regions.

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