Modelling Coalition Formation over Time for Iterative Coalition Games
作者： Carlos Merida-Campos , Steven Willmott
关键词: Computer science 、 Simple (philosophy) 、 Bidding 、 Mathematical economics 、 Simulation 、 Core (game theory)
摘要: Coalition formation problems arise when groups of agents need to work together achieve tasks in an environment - such as bidding for a contract or bulk buying goods. The presented here shows how current theories coalition can be combined with notions from iterative games cover cases where populations must solve many times modelling long series rather than just single one. paper includes problem formulation games, experimental results simple game world demonstrating strong coalitions emerge over time even basic strategies and discussion the interactions between different time.
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