Incentive Mechanism for Cooperative Intrusion Response: A Dynamic Game Approach

摘要: Multi-hop D2D (Device-to-Device) communication is often exposed to many intrusions for its inherent properties, such as openness and weak security protection. To mitigate the in time, one of significant approaches establish a Cooperative Intrusion Response System (CIRS) respond intrusion activities during data transmission. In CIRS, user equipments that act relays (RUEs) are assumed actively help destination nodes activities. However, this assumption invalid multi-hop because RUEs selfish unwilling spend extra resources on undertaking response tasks. address problem, game approach proposed encourage cooperate. detail, we formulate an incentive mechanism CIRS dynamic achieve optimal solution decide whether participate detection or not. Theoretical analysis shows only Nash equilibrium exists game. Simulations demonstrate our can efficiently motivate potential response, it also block propagation time.