You better be honest: Discouraging free-riding and false-reporting in mobile crowdsourcing

作者: Xiang Zhang , Guoliang Xue , Ruozhou Yu , Dejun Yang , Jian Tang

DOI: 10.1109/GLOCOM.2014.7037593

关键词:

摘要: Crowdsourcing is an emerging paradigm where users can pay for the services they need or receive rewards providing services. One example in wireless networking mobile crowdsourcing, which leverages a cloud computing platform recruiting to collect data (such as photos, videos, user activities, etc) applications various domains, such environmental monitoring, social networking, healthcare, transportation, etc. However, critical problem arises how ensure that what deserve. Free-riding and false-reporting may make system vulnerable dishonest users. In this paper, we aim design schemes tackle these problems, so each individual better off being honest. We first mechanism EFF eliminates behavior with help from trusted third party arbitration. then another DFF which, without any party, discourages free-riding false-reporting. prove existence of false-reporting, while guaranteeing truthfulness, rationality, budget-balance, computational efficiency. also semi-truthful, when rest individuals are honest, budget-balance Performance evaluation shows within our mechanisms, no could bring extra benefit individual.

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