作者: T. Lenaerts , T. Lenaerts , L. M. Pereira , F. C. Santos , T. A. Han
DOI:
关键词: Psychology 、 Social psychology 、 If and only if 、 Action (philosophy) 、 Behavioral evolution 、 Mistake 、 Relevance (law) 、 Dilemma 、 Evolutionary game theory 、 Context (language use) 、 Law and economics
摘要: When making a mistake, individuals are willing to apologize secure further cooperation, even if the apology is costly. Similarly, arrange commitments guarantee that an action such as cooperative one in others’ best interest, and thus will be carried out avoid eventual penalties for commitment failure. Hence, both should go side by behavioral evolution. Here we discuss our work published [6], wherein study relevance of combination those two strategies context iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD). We show apologizing acts rare non-committed interactions, especially whenever cooperation very costly, arranging prior can considerably increase frequency behavior. In addition, with or without commitments, resolves conflicts only it sincere, i.e. costly enough. Most interestingly, model predicts tend use much costlier committed relationships than otherwise, because helps better identify free-riders fake committers.