Inequality and riots: experimental evidence

作者: Klaus Abbink , David Masclet , Daniel Mirza

DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.1752258

关键词: PhenomenonDisadvantagedSet (psychology)Experimental economicsInequalityDemographic economicsStochastic gamePolitical scienceSocial inequalitySocial conflictSocial psychology

摘要: We study the relationship between inequality and inter-groups conflicts (riots), focussing on social inequality. Disadvantaged societal groups experience discrimination thus have limited access to some labour resources like education or employment. The aim of our paper is twofold. First, we experimentally investigate under which conditions explains inter-group conflicts. Second, factors that make preferences for riot translate into actions. Riots require coordination. Our experiment consists a two-stage game. subjects play proportional rent-seeking game share prize. Social modelled exogenously by attributing (the advantaged group) larger price than other disadvantaged same amount effort. In second stage players can coordinate with members their group reduce ("burn") members’ payoff. Treatments differ in degree set two groups. observe frequent conflicts, where, as expected, more Surprisingly, frequency riots decreases A control treatment allows us identify resignation driving force behind this phenomenon.

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