摘要: Abstract Given a finite set of players, we investigate coalition formation under restricted communication. One random “call” per player is allowed and coalitions form only after the calls, which unite subsets one by one, are executed. This mechanism provides simple model bounded rationality. We characterize possible topologies induced communications networks. A cooperative game defined on admissible according to call realization. Such may have an empty core, but demonstrate class these games related communication nonempty cores.
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