Bargaining power in communication networks
作者： Antoni Calvó-Armengol
DOI: 10.1016/S0165-4896(00)00049-4
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摘要: Abstract The aim of this paper is to determine how the place a player in network communications affects her bargaining power with respect others. We adapt Rubinstein-Stahl two-player noncooperative game alternating offers case n players connected through graph. show that has unique stationary subgame perfect equilibrium outcome from which we derive measure. This measure satisfies properties efficiency, anonymity, monotonicity, local impact, weighted fairness and fair reallocation define discuss.
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