The political economy of fiscal policy and economic management in oil exporting countries

作者: Alan Gelb , Benn Eifert , Borje Nils Tallroth

DOI: 10.1596/1813-9450-2899

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摘要: Despite massive oil rent incomes since the early 1970s, economic performance of oil-exporting countries - with notable exceptions is poor. While there extensive literature on management resources, analysis underlying political determinants this poor more sparse. Drawing concepts from comparative institutionalist tradition in science, Eifert, Gelb, and Tallroth develop a generalized typology states that used analyzing economy fiscal widely differing systems. In assessing performance, authors focus issues long-term savings, stabilization, efficient use rents. The comparisons country experiences suggest strong, mature, democratic traditions have advantages managing rents well because their ability to reach consensus, educated informed electorates, high level transparency facilitates clear decisions how over long horizon. Yet even these systems, ensuring cautious income continuing struggle. Traditional modernizing autocracies also demonstrated sustain decision horizons implement developmental policies. But resistance danger oil-led spending expenditure commitments becoming major legitimizing force behind state may pose risk sustainability current development strategies. contrast, little positive effect can be expected politically unstable, predatory autocracies, which typically very short policy sometimes characteristics "roving bandit" regimes. Factional democracies, weak parties highly personalized politics, present particular challenges they lack sufficiently effective system create consensus among strong competing interests. Special attention will needed increase raise public awareness countries. And makes it difficult constituency favor sound, longer-run weakens incentives for agents support checks balances impinge individual plans appropriate further demonstrate technical solutions such as establishment stabilization funds budgetary reforms enhance efficiency not work unless constituencies developed measures. This paper product Office Chief Economist, Africa Region -is part larger effort region improve finance, including revenues natural resources.

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