Rents as Distractions: Why the Exit from Transition is Prolonged

作者: Alan Gelb , Arye L. Hillman , Heinrich W. Ursprung

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-72111-3_3

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摘要: The notions of rent and rent-seeking have a substantial contribution to make in offering theoretical analytical framework for understanding events behavior the transition. theory reveals how economic incentives combined with political discretion unclear property rights attract individuals’ attention unproductive activities directed at contesting available rents. This paper provides review focus on role rents We indicate can be endemic an economy transition, recognition enhances reasons why transition market is extended process..

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