Axiomatic characterization of task oriented negotiation
作者： Dongmo Zhang
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摘要: This paper presents an axiomatic analysis of negotiation problems within task-oriented domains (TOD). We start by applying three classical bargaining solutions Nash, Kalai-Smorodinsky and Egalitarian to the with a preprocess randomization on possible agreements. find out that these coincide any TOD can be characterized same set axioms, which specify solution task oriented as outcome dual-process maximizing cost reduction minimizing workload imbalance. characterization is then used produce approximate domain without
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