The bargaining problem without convexity: extending the egalitarian and Kalai-Smorodinsky solutions
作者： John P. Conley , Simon Wilkie
DOI: 10.1016/0165-1765(91)90199-U
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摘要: Abstract We relax the assumption used in axiomatic bargaining theory that feasible set be convex. Instead we require only it 7 comprehensive. show on this domain, Kalai's (1977) characterization of egalitarian solution remains true, as does Kalai and Smorodinsky's (1975) theorem if use weak Pareto optimality.
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