Say Pays! Shareholder Voice and Firm Performance

作者: Vicente Cuñat , Mireia Gine , Maria Guadalupe

DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.2240410

关键词:

摘要: This paper estimates the effects of Say-on-Pay (SoP); a policy that increases shareholder “voice” by providing shareholders with regular vote on executive pay. We apply regression discontinuity design to votes shareholder-sponsored SoP proposals. Adopting leads large in market value (4.6%) and improvements long-term performance: profitability labor productivity increase, while overheads investment fall. In contrast, we find limited pay levels structure. suggests operates as confidence, increasing efficiency value.

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