The Impact of Corruption on Investment: Predictability Matters

作者: J. Edgardo Campos , Donald Lien , Sanjay Pradhan

DOI: 10.1016/S0305-750X(99)00040-6

关键词:

摘要: Abstract This paper argues that it is not only level of corruption affects investment but also the nature corruption. Corruption regimes are more predictable—in sense those seeking favors from government do obtain favors—have less negative impact on than predictable. Using data collected by World Bank in preparing Development Report 1997, we provide empirical support for conjecture.

参考文章(16)
Anne O. Kreuger, The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society The American Economic Review. ,vol. 64, pp. 291- 303 ,(1974)
Shang-Jin Wei, Why is Corruption So Much More Taxing Than Tax? Arbitrariness Kills Social Science Research Network. ,(1997) , 10.3386/W6255
Susan Rose-Ackerman, Corruption: A study in political economy ,(1978)
Robert W. Vishny, Andrei Shleifer, Kevin M. Murphy, Why Is Rent-Seeking So Costly to Growth? The American Economic Review. ,vol. 83, pp. 409- 414 ,(1993)
P. Mauro, Corruption and Growth Quarterly Journal of Economics. ,vol. 110, pp. 681- 712 ,(1995) , 10.2307/2946696
Robert Wade, The system of administrative and political corruption: Canal irrigation in South India Journal of Development Studies. ,vol. 18, pp. 287- 328 ,(1982) , 10.1080/00220388208421833
Jagdish N. Bhagwati, Directly Unproductive, Profit-seeking (DUP) Activities Journal of Political Economy. ,vol. 90, pp. 988- 1002 ,(1982) , 10.1086/261104
Douglass Cecil. North, Structure and Change in Economic History ,(1981)