How Do Japanese Employees React to Performance-Related Pay?: The Working of Hybrid Organizations

作者: Mitsuharu Miyamoto

DOI: 10.1007/978-981-10-8851-3_4

关键词:

摘要: This chapter discusses the work of performance-related pay (PRP) within hybrid organization. Although a organization intends to raise employees’ motivation for by two measures, stimulating incentives PRP and providing stable employment long-term (LTE), measures may conflict with each other. Thus, scheme be modified weakened compatible LTE. From these perspectives, is analyzed specifying three types motivation: achieving individual outcome, contributing performance, challenging new task. It found that works effectively along expected lines achieve whereas it restrictively second third motivations. We further discovered effect satisfaction compensates lack LTE concerning outcome. if employees are required only their own not needed as long achieved. In this way, can predicted shifts other structure strengthened without On contrary, contribute organization’s performance challenge task, confirmed effective.

参考文章(14)
David Marsden, A Theory of Employment Systems Oxford University Press. ,(1999) , 10.1093/0198294220.001.0001
George Olcott, Conflict and Change Cambridge University Press. ,(2009) , 10.1017/CBO9780511657429
Alison L Booth, Jeff Frank, Performance-Related Pay Research Papers in Economics. ,(1997)
Katsuyuki Kubo, Takuji Saito, The effect of mergers on employment and wages: Evidence from Japan Journal of the Japanese and International Economies. ,vol. 26, pp. 263- 284 ,(2012) , 10.1016/J.JJIE.2011.04.001
Nicolai J. Foss, Keld Laursen, Performance Pay, Delegation and Multitasking under Uncertainty and Innovativeness: An Empirical Investigation Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. ,vol. 58, pp. 246- 276 ,(2005) , 10.1016/J.JEBO.2004.03.018
Wolfgang Streeck, Kathleen Thelen, Introduction: Institutional Change in Advanced Political Economies Beyond continuity: institutional change in advanced political economies. pp. 1- 39 ,(2005)
Bengt Holmstrom, Paul Milgrom, Multitask Principal–Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design Journal of Law Economics & Organization. ,vol. 7, pp. 24- 52 ,(1991) , 10.1093/JLEO/7.SPECIAL_ISSUE.24