Protection Against Return Oriented Programming Attacks
作者： Stephen A. Fischer
DOI:
关键词:
摘要: In one embodiment, a processor includes at least execution unit. The also Return Oriented Programming (ROP) logic coupled to the ROP may validate return pointer stored on call stack based secret value. value only be accessible by operating system.
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