Transparent detection and extraction of return-oriented-programming attacks

作者: Junghwan Rhee , Guofei Jiang , Zhenyu Wu , Zhichun Li , Hui Zhang

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摘要: Systems and methods for detection prevention of Return-Oriented-Programming (ROP) attacks in one or more applications, including an attack device a stack inspection performing to detect ROP gadgets stack. The includes walking from frame at top the toward bottom failure conditions, determining whether valid return code address is present; condition type if no present, with Type III conditions indicating attack. contained using containment device, detected during are analyzed analysis device.

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