Essays on Asymmetric Information and Environmental Regulation through Disclosure

作者: Jorge García

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摘要: This dissertation delves into different aspects of a relatively new policy approach for industrial pollution control: the public dissemination information by regulators regarding environmental performance firms. These schemes are sometimes referred to as regulation through disclosure or informational regulation. It is presumed that an triggers and intensifies interactions between polluting firms workers, community groups, consumers, owners. thus increases costs noncompliance with law channels do not directly involve regulator. The understanding important market emergence together evidence suggesting can influence firms’ performance, have resulted in certain enthusiasm these approaches. There however still voids theoretical foundations regulation, well empirical supporting its alleged effectiveness (in particular developing emerging economies). aims at contributing growing literature on both regards. discussion consists four self-contained chapters. Chapter 1 looks some issues compliance under asymmetric information. Chapters 2 3 constitute evaluation well-structured program, Indonesia’s PROPER, while 4 studies more informal type provision Central Eastern Europe. Informal mechanisms such disgrace faced managers owners moral suasion been suggested possible explanatory factors firm behavior. first contribution this area. Building earlier work, develops model social where highly face stigmatization losses reputation society. I argue symmetric silent assumption papers necessarily met case. study situations perfectly observable imperfectly observable. findings show relaxing perfect observability assumption, even small margin, could profound effects functions way high levels cannot be sustained equilibrium. evaluate program PROPER. main result was responsible rapid significant reduction emissions intensity measured biochemical oxygen demand, BOD, chemical COD (the characteristics those were most responsive also unveiled). Europe during years transition. analysis reveals enforcement forces behind implementation Environmental Management Practices. 2, strengthen belief thin markets other sluggish results imperfect indicate promising strategy tackle presence weak institutions.

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