作者: Paul Lanoie , Jérôme Foulon
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摘要: An increasing number of regulators have adopted public disclosure programs to create incentives for pollution control. Previous empirical analyses monitoring and enforcement issues focused strictly on the impact such traditional practices as (inspections) (fines penalties) polluters' environmental performance. Other separately programs. But can these in addition normal fines penalties? The authors study both information strategies context a single program, gain insights into relative emerging (public disclosure) strategies. Their results suggest that strategy by province British Columbia, Canada, has greater emission levels compliance status than do orders, fines, penalties traditionally imposed courts Ministry Environment. their also demonstrate adopting stricter standards higher significantly affected levels. Policymakers, take note: 1) presence strong, clear together with significant, credible penalty system sends appropriate signals regulated community, which responds lowering emissions. 2) performance creates strong additional control pollution.