Experimental analysis of the use of fishery closures and cooperatives to reduce economic rent dissipation caused by assignment problems

摘要: Assignment problems in quota-managed fisheries are caused by spatial and temporal heterogeneity the productivity of stock. If quota management system is not fully delineated (e.g. harvest rights assigned to particular areas) then fishers will compete with each other overexploit parts fishery where or when quota unit value highest (i.e. fishing costs low and/ market price high), leading economic rent dissipation. This study used experimental economics assess effectiveness closures income-sharing cooperatives in resolving assignment across three different varying levels fisher numbers owners lease quota fishers). While most were successful reducing dissipation under closure management structure relative to their baseline(s), characterized a greater number lease less effective. This was due differential values that lease place on resource relative owners, having insecurity tenure diminished wealth bid for a quota package pay it using revenue from fishing. Conversely, equally all three baseline(s). because created an incentive coordinate fishing effort, particularly among heterogeneous groups. requiring further exposition field, these results represent first step identifying institutions that may assist resolve dynamic environment.