Veto Players in Legislative Games: Fake and Real

作者: Matti Wiberg

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-531-91773-3_4

关键词:

摘要: Institutions matter. In law-making every nation does proceed according to its own peculiar methods. legislative games the formal institutional structure poses many kinds of constraints as how bills are processed and what various actors can do at stages game. These modify choice set relevant actors. Indeed, they even dictate who players in first place. The also temporal ordering things, namely: when? constitution settles sequence possible moves by

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