The role of royalty rates in determining monitoring costs of restaurant franchise contracts: an agency theory perspective.

作者: Yae Sock Roh

DOI: 10.1300/J150V07N01_04

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摘要: Abstract The purpose of this research is to examine determinants royalty rates in restaurant franchising from a monitoring costs perspective utilizing agency theory. primary hypothesis the study that associated with franchisees are inversely related levied by franchisor. Agency problems specifically franchise contracts identified. An empirical model for relation developed test series hypotheses. Empirical evidence largely supports when franchisor perceives activities difficult and/or costly, tends lower induce franchisee's efforts.

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