Economics of oil regulation and the Brazilian reform: Some issues

作者: Adriana Hernandez-Perez

DOI: 10.1016/J.ENPOL.2010.09.004

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摘要: Abstract This paper reviews the economic fundamentals for regulation in oil industry, with a focus on current regulatory proposal Brazilian industry. The observed exploration and production (E&P) contracts foresee much of characteristics optimal contract, remuneration structure that combines upfront future payments to mitigate uncertainty incentivize exploratory efforts. In Brazil, despite slow market deconcentration since 1997’s liberalization, is general consistent an response. From standpoint, 2009’s new prompted by major discoveries offshore Brazil reduces power incentive schemes respect cost-reducing efforts while changes net risk E&P activities are not so clear.

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