Modelling Government Processes and Policies in Agriculture: A Review
作者： R.W.M. Johnson
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摘要: In this paper, political preference functions and bargaining models based on game theory are examined for their relevance to government processes policies in agriculture. While show some refinements over explaining how interest group demands met a modern society, the results appear still fall short of well-documented understanding economy institutions involved policy decisions. practical terms, economic modelling is too time-consuming elaborate inform everyday decisions but an principles previous kind analysis can work both advisors decision makers.
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