What Determines Public Expenditure Allocations? A Review of Theories, and Implications for Agricultural Public Investment

作者: Tewodaj Mogues

DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.2198472

关键词:

摘要: This paper addresses the determinants of public expenditure policies, by reviewing theories and empirical investigations what features explain budget process how various attributes actors — including politicians, bureaucrats, interest groups, donors institutions political economic governance environments affect prioritization investments. It draws conclusions with regard to agricultural investments.Studies that explicitly examine as it pertains ministries agencies in developing countries question relevance formal understanding decisions are actually made. There exists a body work, adhering so-called garbage can budgeting model, which, although clearly rejecting notion textbook reality, seems also reject there any systematic politico-economic or other influences on expenditures apportioned across competing needs. The budgetary model incrementalism, at extreme, models makers backward looking changes allocation incremental. Another literature focuses nature which trade-offs not passage final however is arrived end process, still implementation execution budget. Discrepancies between approved executed sector come form leakages, they occur because lack capacity execute changing priorities mid–fiscal year.One conception prevalent economics offers an economistic view resource undertaken benevolent autocratic (in sense unencumbered) social planner seeking maximize aggregate welfare. Other distinct branches have developed within choice literature, those depart from unencumbered policymaker. One such branch this analyzes outcomes emerging interface budget-maximizing bureaucrats vote-seeking politicians. In collective action characteristics groups broadest term) these groups’ ability press for investments, subsidies, interventions, favorable them. An interesting phenomenon policy processes seeming existence status quo bias among policymakers, policies outlived their usefulness, input appear often fail be discontinued. A diverse examines actors, sets incentives, constraints, preferences, reach influence over spending countries.It difficult attribute policymakers’ actions creation improvement certain services. Incorrect imperfect attribution, turn, dampens (political) incentives undertake effort improving services infrastructure drives extent attribution achieved depends visibility length lag time when resources allocated provide good service created. helps underinvestment research.Areas large infrastructural capital investments lend themselves more rent-seeking activities officials. prevalence corruption society thus affects composition spending, increasing quality will lower. effect wider complex, nonlinear fully conclusive literature.

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