The Impact of Prior Performance on Leadership Appointment in a Merger of Equals

摘要: Leadership appointment during mergers has a logical and established precedent when there is clear target acquirer. However, in the extraordinary case of Merger Of Equals (MOEs) – where this relatively equal ownership, board representation, earnings contribution etc process much less defined can often have serious consequences on merger, both closing negotiations as well post-merger performance. Intuition assumes better performing CEO should will be appointed. In practice, however, that not case. It arguable performance through objective means (financially & operationally), yet usually resolved political financial concessions. Building upon previous studies employing public information reported data multivariate statistical analyses, study examines two research questions pertinent to MOE leadership appointment. First prior merger CEOs significant predictor for selection MOEs, second what metrics past by CEOs, if any, are significantly correlated with short-term operational success merged company? Determining whether or relationship exists between selection, influence Mergers Equals.