Worker Responses to Shirking

摘要: Group incentive systems have to overcome the free rider or 1/N problem, which gives workers an shirk, if they are succeed. This paper uses new questions on responses shirking from General Social Survey and a special NBER survey of in 14 companies over 300 worksites with some form group pay examine how well can monitor their peers what do when not working up speed. Most say that detect fellow employees who shirk. Many report would speak shirker behavior supervisor, many doing so past. The proportion takes action against shirkers is greatest among paid under systems, smaller companies, good employeemanagement relations. incentives interact high-performance human resource policies such as employee involvement teams, training, task variety, low levels supervision, fixed wages induce more act shirking. In addition, workplaces where there anti-shirking co-workers work harder, encourage other more, workplace facility effective several dimensions related productivity profits. We cast doubt alternative theory shared capitalism causally but both consequences production processes based certain technologies.