Corporate failure as a means to corporate responsibility

作者: Dwight R. Lee , Richard B. McKenzie

DOI: 10.1007/BF00881666

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摘要: Milton Friedman has argued that corporations have no responsibility to society beyond of obeying the law and maximizing profits for shareholders. Individuals may social responsibilities according Friedman, but not corporations. When executives make contributions address problems in name corporation, they are doing so with other people's (shareholders') money. The corporate is a fiduciary one, serve as an agent corporation's shareholders, uphold shareholders' trust, which requires maximize return their who can then, if choose, contribute own money worthy causes. Of course, shareholders face decision inherent classic “prisoners' dilemma,” where choices collectively sensible individually unreasonable. Given dilemma, should expect be able control sufficiently them perfect agents, dutifully seeking shareholder every decision. But, at least ideal, would argue executivesshould agents andshould reduce by contributing Friedman's critics focused on assumptions implicit conceptual framework, one more important purpose this paper stay within framework and, same time, question view business, even ideal. We do focusing directly how managers will behave, given status extant costs must incur closely monitor executives, then drawing insights regarding inefficient provision community or public goods, best articulated himself. many generate positive neighborhood, spillover, effects. Because these spillovers, prisoners' dilemma exists collective rationality calling everyone solution problem, it being irrational from perspective each individual such contribution. Once recognized, possibility all worse off corporation had ability exert over thereby preventing violating prescription making excess profit levels.

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