The Theory of the Firm and the Structure of the Franchise Contract

作者: Paul H. Rubin

DOI: 10.1002/9780470752135.CH13

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摘要: Uses the tools of Coase's (1937) theory firm, and an analysis property rights, incentives monitoring, to assess nature franchise contract. Franchising is interest economists because it represents a situation in which there not sharp distinction between interfirm intrafirm transactions. The institutional structure discussed, agreement defined as contract two legal firms--the franchisor, or parent company, franchisee, firm set up specific location market product service offered by company. franchisee pays amount money for right this service. standard explanation franchising, terms capital markets, then considered rejected. debated that franchisors use franchising means raise capital. However, considering argument light modern theory, concluded franchisor interested raising would do better create portfolio shares many outlets order diversify risks maximize profit potential. An alternative motivations given suggests both parts give rights parties, i.e., areas they can most efficiently control. Finally, application antitrust law found be false, since confuses categories with economically meaningful ones. (SFL)

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