Revenue Choice on a Serial Network

作者: David M. Levinson

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摘要: A model to examine the choice by jurisdiction whether finance roads with taxes or tolls is de veloped. The idea of decentralised, local control and multiple jurisdictions distinguishes this anal ysis from one where a central authority maximises global welfare. Key factors posited explain include length trips using roads, size governing jurisdiction, elasticity demand revenue instruments, transaction costs collection. These dictate scope free rider problem associated financing. Spatial complexity in ensues because residents use both non-local networks, each jurisdiction's network used residents. thesis argues that, since try do well their who are voters travellers, effects instrument on key consideration that rev enue instrument. Decentralisation lower toll collection identified as con ditions under which would be more likely become preferred for highways.

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