Confirmation, Paradoxes, and Possible Worlds

作者: SHELLEY STILLWELL

DOI: 10.1093/BJPS/36.1.19

关键词:

摘要: In a landmark essay, Hempel claimed to show that two unexceptionable theses about confirmation must lead seemingly paradoxical conclusions (see [1945]). Rather than reject those theses, sought establish the they threaten us with are not genuinely paradoxical. The appearance of paradox, he held, is simply 'psychological illusion' ([1945], p. i8). I will argue paradoxes do follow from held them from. Moreover, in interesting cases additional needed derive or support quite certainly false. My arguments depend on our accepting, as himself does, what shall call 'sentential interpretation' confirmation. According this interpretation, 'logical relationship between sentences', is, it sentences which confirm and confirmed (Hempel [19451, 25). Much Hempel's classic discussion couched rather terms 'objectual On approach one treats objects confirming various hypotheses 'hypothesis-sentences'. It appears considered these interpretations be logically indistinguishable.' We see so. validity affected by one's choice sentential objectual interpretations. Hence, heavy reliance interpretation results remain valid when reformulated exclusively terms. An appeal thus becomes necessary

参考文章(15)
Israel Scheffler, The anatomy of inquiry ,(1963)
R. G. Swinburne, II. THE PARADOXES OF CONFIRMATION ? A SURVEY American Philosophical Quarterly. ,vol. 8, ,(1971)
Nelson Goodman, Fact, Fiction, and Forecast ,(1955)
L. JONATHAN COHEN, A LOGIC FOR EVIDENTIAL SUPPORT (II) The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science. ,vol. 17, pp. 105- 126 ,(1966) , 10.1093/BJPS/17.2.105
D. H. Mellor, A. J. Ayer, Probability and evidence The Philosophical Quarterly. ,vol. 23, pp. 272- ,(1973) , 10.2307/2218012
H. G. ALEXANDER, THE PARADOXES OF CONFIRMATION The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science. ,vol. 9, pp. 227- 233 ,(1958) , 10.1093/BJPS/IX.35.227
C. A. HOOKER, D. STOVE, Relevance and the ravens The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science. ,vol. 18, pp. 305- 315 ,(1968) , 10.1093/BJPS/18.4.305
CARL G. HEMPEL, THE WHITE SHOE: NO RED HERRING The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science. ,vol. 18, pp. 239- 240 ,(1967) , 10.1093/BJPS/18.3.239
H. G. ALEXANDER, THE PARADOXES OF CONFIRMATION—A REPLY TO DR AGASSI The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science. ,vol. 10, pp. 229- 234 ,(1959) , 10.1093/BJPS/X.39.229
Richard Swinburne, An introduction to confirmation theory ,(1973)