Why Multilateralism? Foreign Aid and Domestic Principal-Agent Problems
作者： Helen V. Milner
DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511491368.005
关键词:
摘要: … The argument here relies on domestic politics and principal-agent problems in the donor … time and across countries using this principal-agent theory of multilateral allocation. Data on …
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researchgate.net 参考文章(30)
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