The Staying Power of the Legislative Status Quo: Collective Choice in Canada's Parliament after Morgentaler

作者: Thomas Flanagan

DOI: 10.1017/S000842390001492X

关键词:

摘要: Rational choice theory has drawn attention to the phenomenon of structure-induced equilibrium in situations potential cycling. When there is no majority, first preference or Condorcet winner, outcome determined by agenda control and institutional rules decision making. Within that context, status quo a special advantage because parliamentary amendment procedure, which quo, as default option bill formal form, not voted upon until last stage. The unsuccessful attempts Canadian government Prime Minister Brian Mulroney respond legislatively Supreme Court's Morgentaler illustrate these general principles rational choice. was unable get legislation passed because, with cyclical configurations opinion both House Commons Senate, rules, especially order voting required favoured quo.

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