Parliamentary Floor Voting Procedures and Agenda Setting in Europe

作者: Bjorn Erik Rasch

DOI: 10.2307/440391

关键词:

摘要: Which voting methods do European parliaments use when they make choices between multiple, mutually exclusive alternatives? To what extent are legislative outcomes affected by differences in floor procedures at the final stage of processes? In first part analysis, I describe parliamentary applied Western and East-Central Europe. It turns out that only two approaches occur: amendment (elimination) procedure, successive procedure. second paper, outline discuss some normative properties political consequences procedures, focusing particular, on principles agenda formation.

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