Managed care, market power, and monopsony.

摘要: Abstract OBJECTIVE: To examine the theoretical possibility of monopsony behavior under managed care insurance. STUDY DESIGN: Use microeconomic theory to how plans with market power would be expected behave, and effects that on consumer supplier welfare. PRINCIPAL FINDINGS: The article shows that, monopsony, welfare consumers may increased but overall economic will necessarily reduced. It offers a test for whether lower prices paid by buyers larger share represent welfare-reducing or welfare-increasing movement away from provider monopoly. says if quantity inputs (supplied conditions increasing long-run marginal cost) declines, is present. also argues translation into premiums consistent nonprofit health plans. In contrast, for-profit obtain reduce as well input suppliers. These conclusions are shown recent empirical research indicating negative relationship between buyer cost per enrollee. CONCLUSIONS: Traditional antitrust policy has not been able deal monopsony. concludes use their medical spending harm well-being both specialized workers care. Antitrust need modified this situation.