Fiscal redistribution in the European Union and the enlargement

作者: Mikko Mattila

DOI: 10.1108/IJOTB-07-04-2004-B004

关键词:

摘要: In this article, fiscal redistribution in the European Union (EU) of 15 member states and enlarged EU is analyzed. Specifically, net transfers between are analyzed, i.e. which countries beneficiaries, contributors what factors affect countries' balances. The results show that, at present, among partly explained by differences relative economic prosperity institutional features that systematically favor smaller states. Small can use their overrepresentation Council votes to obtain more benefits than level development alone would justify. If pre-enlargement extended include new states, costs could amount 60 billion euros. This means balance current decrease significantly. Furthermore, Treaty Nice does not change malapportionment Parliament seats, gives an advantage small bargaining for

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