Voting in Hiring Committees: Which "Almost" Rule Is Optimal?

作者: Eyal Baharad , Leif Danziger

DOI: 10.1007/S10726-017-9553-7

关键词:

摘要: We determine the scoring rule that is most likely to select a high-ability candidate. A major result neither widely used plurality nor inverse-plurality are ever optimal, and Borda hardly optimal. Furthermore, we show only almost-plurality, almost-inverse-plurality, almost-Borda can be Which of “almost” rules optimal depends on likelihood candidate has high ability how committee members correctly identify abilities different candidates.

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