Scoring rules and social choice properties: some characterizations

摘要: In many voting systems, voters’ preferences on a set of candidates are represented by linear orderings. this context, scoring rules well-known procedures to aggregate the voters. Under these rules, each candidate obtains fixed number points, \(s_k\), time he/she is ranked \(k\)th one voter and ordered according total points they receive. order identify best rule use in situation, we need know which properties met procedures. Although some have been analyzed extensively, there other that not studied for all rules. paper, consider two desirable social choice properties, Pareto-optimality immunity absolute loser paradox, establish characterizations satisfy specific axioms. Moreover, also provide proof result given Saari Barney (The Mathematical Intelligencer 25:17–31, 2003), where meeting reversal symmetry characterized. From results characterization, relationships among properties. Finally, give characterization satisfying three