Non-Additive Degrees of Belief

作者: Rolf Haenni , None

DOI: 10.1007/978-1-4020-9198-8_6

关键词:

摘要: This paper starts from the position that belief is primarily quantitative and not categorical, i.e. we generally assume existence of various degrees belief. corresponds to observation most human beings experience as a matter degree. We follow usual convention such are values in [0, 1]-interval, including two extreme cases 0 for “no belief” 1 “full belief”.1 Any other value unit interval represents its own level certitude, thus allowing quantification statements like “I strongly believe . .” or can hardly ...”. In this sense, make strict distinction between faith, latter always being absolute. perfect accordance with following definition belief:

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