Cost Allocation as Cooperative Games

作者: Jens Leth Hougaard

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-01828-2_3

关键词:

摘要: There is a wide range of situations where group agents (broadly interpreted as persons, departments, organizations or countries) benefit from cooperative actions, but left with the problem sharing related costs. These everyday life problems such people cab to international agreements like Kyoto protocol industrialized countries bargain over emission cuts. In situations, cab, there are rarely time make use sophisticated allocation rules even though itself may be rather complex: typically becomes more less random and often tend thumb.In bargaining between cuts, final outcome will reflect power than considerations fairness

参考文章(34)
David Housman, Lori Clark, Note International Journal of Game Theory. ,vol. 27, pp. 611- 616 ,(1998) , 10.1007/S001820050093
David J. Bartholomew, Mathematical methods in social science ,(1981)
Marcin Malawski, Andrzej Wieczorek, Agnieszka Wiszniewska-Matyszkiel, Game theory and mathematical economics Institute of Mathematics, Polish Academy of Sciences. ,(2006)
Stanley J. Folmsbee, Joseph Sirera Ransmeier, The Tennessee Valley Authority : a case study in the economics of multiple purpose stream planning Journal of Southern History. ,vol. 9, pp. 280- ,(1943) , 10.2307/2191820
S. C. Littlechild, G. F. Thompson, Aircraft Landing Fees: A Game Theory Approach The Bell Journal of Economics. ,vol. 8, pp. 186- 204 ,(1977) , 10.2307/3003493
Judith Timmer, Peter Borm, Stef Tijs, On three Shapley-like solutions for cooperative games with random payoffs International Journal of Game Theory. ,vol. 32, pp. 595- 613 ,(2004) , 10.1007/S001820400181
Lloyd S. Shapley, A Value for n-person Games Contributions to the Theory of Games. pp. 307- 317 ,(1952) , 10.1017/CBO9780511528446.003
Peter Sudhölter, Bezalel Peleg, Introduction to the Theory of Cooperative Games ,(1983)