Public Disclosure of Patent Applications, R&D, and Welfare

作者: Yossi Spiegel , Reiko Aoki

DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.146414

关键词:

摘要: In Europe and in Japan, patent applications are publicly disclosed after 18 month from the filing date regardless of whether a has been or will be registered. U.S. contrast, only when is granted. this paper we examine consequences difference for (i) firm's R&D patenting behavior, (ii) consumers' surplus social welfare, (iii) incentives firms to innovate, setting where protection imperfect sense that may rejected patents not always upheld court. The main conclusions public disclosure leads fewer innovations, but given number it raises probability new technologies reach product market thereby enhances possibly total welfare as well.

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