作者: Janusz A Ordover
DOI: 10.1257/JEP.5.1.43
关键词: Policy analysis 、 Microeconomics 、 Property law 、 Patent system 、 Economics 、 Technological change 、 Adversary 、 Intellectual property 、 Dynamic efficiency 、 Incentive
摘要: Public policy analysis of optimal patent regimes is often framed as a tradeoff between static and dynamic efficiency. In this analytical framework, weak protection strict antitrust are taken to be directed toward concerns, while intellectual property through strong laws reflection broader social concerns for long-run growth technological progress. This characterization has some truth, but the magnitude conflict efficiency, can easily exaggerated. article, I want argue that need not inimical economic and, conversely, an enemy diffusion. Appropriately structured law rules together ensure incentives R&D also induce cooperation among firms in diffusing results licensing other means. At same time, at stage counterbalance by internalizing spillovers from ongoing programs, such may produce additional existing knowledge.