How access pricing and entry interact

作者: Martin Cave , Ingo Vogelsang

DOI: 10.1016/J.TELPOL.2003.08.004

关键词:

摘要: Abstract The paper reviews the preceeding theoretical and econometric analysis, case study of Netherlands. It suggests that entrants’ strategies will be influenced by level access prices on degree investment in infrastructure which entrants have to make eligible purchase interconnection services at wholesale prices. Entrants typically invest first replicable assets, then progress less ones—although this also depend upon their initial endowments. This entry may best encouraged initially low prices, with those possibly increasing over time as assets are replicated.

参考文章(7)
David M. Mandy, Killing the Goose That May Have Laid the Golden Egg: Only the Data Know Whether Sabotage Pays Journal of Regulatory Economics. ,vol. 17, pp. 157- 172 ,(2000) , 10.1023/A:1008191911289
Mark Armstrong, The theory of access pricing and interconnection In: Cave, M and Majumdar, S and Vogelsang, I, (eds.) Handbook of Telecommunications Economics (vol I). (pp. 297-386). North-Holland: Amsterdam. (2002). ,(2001)
Martin Cave, From cost plus determinations to a network price cap Information Economics and Policy. ,vol. 9, pp. 151- 160 ,(1997) , 10.1016/S0167-6245(97)00005-X
Shane Greenstein, Susan Mcmaster, Pablo T. Spiller, The Effect of Incentive regulation on Infrastructure Modernization: Local Exchange Companies' Deployment of Digital Technology Journal of Economics and Management Strategy. ,vol. 4, pp. 187- 236 ,(1995) , 10.1111/J.1430-9134.1995.00187.X
M. Ishaq Nadiri, Banani Nandi, Telecommunications infrastructure and economic development Edward Elgar Publishing. pp. 293- 314 ,(2003) , 10.4337/9781781950630.00019
Lars-Hendrik Röller, Leonard Waverman, Telecommunications Infrastructure and Economic Development: A Simultaneous Approach The American Economic Review. ,vol. 91, pp. 909- 923 ,(2001) , 10.1257/AER.91.4.909