Development of Water Markets Using Experimental Economics

作者: Ariel Dinar , Richard E. Howitt , S. J. Rassenti , Vernon L. Smith

DOI: 10.1007/978-0-585-32088-5_16

关键词:

摘要: The large, complex water systems throughout the world, including Western U.S., have traditionally required a centralized authority both to solve their fundamental coordination problems and dictate solutions allocation issues. These are often exacerbated by factors such as public good nature of water, externalities associated with transporting consuming economies scale in shared production facilities. In our world rapid technological environmental change, these centrally-managed tend move too slowly allow society adapt efficiently. One proposals for substantial institutional change is that adaptation irreversibility make process slow, cautious, costly society. this chapter, we will discuss recent development of’ smart’, computer-assisted markets (xcMcCabe et al., 1991) which provide promise developing decentralized problems, role experimental economics can play evaluating proposed changes help facilitate more smooth adoption changes.

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