Impact of communication and information on a complex heterogeneous closed water catchment environment
作者： John G. Tisdell , John R. Ward , Tim Capon
DOI: 10.1029/2003WR002868
关键词: Water use 、 Environmental economics 、 Crop loss 、 Sanctions 、 Natural flow 、 Applied economics 、 Common value auction 、 Water collection 、 Common-pool resource 、 Engineering 、 Environmental resource management
摘要: [1] This paper uses an experimental design that combines the use of environmental levy with community involvement in formation group agreements and strategies to explore impact information communication on water a complex heterogeneous environment. Participants experiments acted as farmers faced monthly demands, uncertain rainfall, possible crop loss, possibility trading entitlements. The treatments included (1) no consequences extraction, (2) provision aggregate information, (3) extraction forum for discussion, (4) public individual discussion giving rise potential verbal peer sanctions. To account trade, were blocked into three market types: open call auctions, closed auctions. cost altering natural flow regime meet extractive demand was socialized through imposition equally imposed all players.
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