Assessing the costs and benefits of individual transferable quota management in the Tasmanian southern rock lobster fishery, Australia

摘要: Understanding how fishers behave and make decisions is critical in determining how best to manage fisheries. If the response of management measures can be predicted, unexpected undesirable outcomes can avoided. Individual transferable quota (ITQ) has been introduced many international fisheries, with purpose accounting for human behaviour, as it theoretically generates behavioural incentives that are aligned objectives (e.g. reducing fishing costs). The ability ITQ systems meet continuing economic, ecological social therefore centred on ensuring fisher behavioural incentives remain those objectives. This thesis used Tasmanian southern rock lobster (TSRL) fishery Australia a case study assess changing practices behaviour under and how this had evolved through time. aim was improve general understanding of implementation design may affect decision-making and improve certainty outcomes. It an system able interactions all ecosystem components (e.g. non-target species) required ecosystem based fisheries management (EBFM) principles. TSRL some extent, more successful than other fisheries these interactions, due the selective benign nature potting. In sustainably certified fisheries, input controls continue place ecosystem components, particularly non-selective trawl). continued use of input however, reduce security fisher’s right loss access potentially separate their from management objectives. Successful also requires managing authority set binding total allowable catch (TAC). Between 2008 2010, non-binding TAC, which reduced price market caused reactivation of latent effort, increase fleet capacity, reduction economic efficiency and dissipation rent, engaged competitive race fish during times high revenue. Changing such “double night fishing” during years potential lead localised stock depletion through concentration however format commercial logbook prevented precise assessment fleet-wide extent impact double night fishing. Consequently, research highlighted importance being to collect fine-scale spatial temporal data effort order enhance decision-making. It important actively own majority of their units. An implicit assumption behind theory ITQs those fishing owners, developed fisheries, free transferability units, undertaken by lease quota fishers. Following analysis physical risk tolerance both quota owners lease fishery, evident their behavioural drivers were divergent. Lease more responsive to changes expected revenue leading areas to significantly higher levels. words were more prepared take greater risks at sea owners when high. result not entirely fishers face costs leasing increasing “cost squeeze” between what must pay what they paid catch. Consequently, underlying business structures are likely different. series experiments that were conducted examine propensity groups varying numbers fishers, coordinate prevent assignment problems that cause rent dissipation. Heterogeneous and quota less successful coordinating communication than homogenous owners. because were less likely adopt socially-optimal strategy preventing dissipation compared having: (i) inequality wealth; (ii) insecurity of tenure and; (iii) asymmetric information exchange. It only the institution income-sharing cooperatives chose to coordinate offset incentive over-appropriate the resource, if participants doubt others would do same. While requiring external validation field, results highlight recognising and understanding differing They need managers consider trade-offs associated allowing free transferability units whether meets overarching objectives. While contributing further discussion debate benefits of ITQ management, understanding behavioural different types inform management decision making. type now future ultimately management systems.